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ARTICLES
THE PURPOSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
CRAFTING RULES TO IMPLEMENT THAT PURPOSE
Thomas K Clancy *
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the purpose of the Fourth Amendment?' How should
rules-legal principles-be crafted to implement that purpose?
This article addresses those questions. Nothing is more funda-
mental to the development of Fourth Amendment principles than
the answers to those questions. Given the wide applicability of
the Fourth Amendment to the countless intrusions by the gov-
ernment in daily life, how the Fourth Amendment is to be con-
strued is itself of fundamental concern to all Americans. It is the
foundation upon which other freedoms rest.2
* Director, National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law and Research Professor,
University of Mississippi School of Law. J.D., Vermont Law School; B.A., University of
Notre Dame. The development of this article benefitted significantly from a workshop with
Professors Christopher Green, Matthew Hall, and Jack Nowlin.
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. [T]he Fourth Amendment may plausibly be viewed as the centerpiece of a
free, democratic society. All the other freedoms presuppose that lawless police
action have [sic] been restrained. What good is freedom of speech or freedom of
religion or any other freedom if law enforcement officers have unfettered power
to violate a person's privacy and liberty when he sits in his home or drives his
car or walks the streets?
Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment and Its Exclusionary Rule, THE CHAMPION, Sept.-
Oct. 1991, at 21 (emphasis omitted).
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In the end, the choices the Supreme Court must make are two:
is the Fourth Amendment designed to regulate law enforcement
practices or is it designed to protect individuals from overreach-
ing governmental intrusions? Rules-legal principles-implement
purpose. If the first view is correct, then the Court should create
a rule book for the police to effectuate their intrusions. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist was a principal proponent of this view: "As
Rehnquist [had] often insisted, the basic function of criminal pro-
cedure jurisprudence is to make 'rules' for police 'in carrying out
their work."'" He had a "particular concern for providing guidance
and flexibility to those who serve the public as law enforcement
officers."" If the second view prevails, then rules should be de-
signed to promote individual security. Of course, the choice is not
completely an either/or one-the Fourth Amendment itself makes
a clear accommodation between liberty and order by prohibiting
only unreasonable searches and seizures. Nonetheless, which
view predominates is highly predictive of results and how the
Court manages the accommodation of governmental interests and
individual rights by drafting legal principles to regulate govern-
mental intrusions.
Part II and Part III demonstrate that, both historically and
currently, the Court has vacillated between the two choices and
has, over time, created a series of mismatches of purposes and
rules, often resulting in incoherent doctrine. Part IV answers the
first question posed in this introduction-the Fourth Amend-
ment's fundamental purpose is to protect individuals. Accepting
that premise as a given, Part V details the consequences of that
purpose-legal principles should be constructed to protect the in-
dividual, including general rules and exceptions to those rules.
Part VI illustrates that framework with a discussion of search in-
3. Craig M. Bradley, Rehnquist's Fourth Amendment: Be Reasonable, 82 MISS. L.J.
259, 294 (2013) (quoting California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 927 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
4. Ann O'Connell, Rehnquist's Fourth Amendment: Protecting Those Who Serve, 82
Miss. L.J. 297, 298 (2013). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote more opinions on the Fourth
Amendment than any other Justice in the history of the Court. See Thomas K. Clancy,
Foreword: William Rehnquist's Fourth Amendment, 82 MISS. L.J. i, ii-iii (2013). His opin-
ions and legacy are examined in Symposium, 2012 Fourth Amendment, 82 MIss. L.J. 259
(2013). Rehnquist's "vision of the Fourth Amendment balance as less restrictive of official
authority grew out of a belief that control over the forces of disorder is a critical predicate
for the preservation of a genuinely free society." James J. Tomkovicz, Rehnquist's Fourth:
A Portrait of the Justice as a Law and Order Man, 82 MiSS. L.J. 359, 367 (2013).
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cident to arrest principles. The final section offers some conclud-
ing thoughts.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHOICE
The Fourth Amendment regulates searches and seizures. How
should such intrusions be defined? Turning first to the concept of
a seizure, how it is defined has important consequences for the
interaction between citizens and the police. To illustrate, drug
dealers or those illegally carrying weapons, when accosted, know
that the object of a police order to halt is ultimately to recover the
contraband the suspect possesses.' A common response to such a
command, therefore, is to dispose of the evidence.' It is crucial to
ascertain whether that disposal occurred prior to or after the sei-
zure.'If before, then the object discarded can be used to justify the
seizure; if after, then the discarded object cannot be used to justi-
fy that which has already occurred.' The observations of Judge
Moylan, long a respected authority on the Fourth Amendment,
highlight the importance of this point:
Although the difference may be measured in nanoseconds, there is a
critical distinction, in terms of Fourth Amendment applicability, be-
tween the jettison of contraband that precedes a police tackle and
the jettison that follows a tackle . . . . Indeed, even Super Bowl
championships may turn on the small but critical difference between
1) fumbling the ball while being tackled and 2) getting rid of the ball
a split-second before being tackled. In this case the appellant, fool-
ishly perhaps, got rid of the ball before being tackled.
When the Fourth Amendment declares that a person has a
right to be secure from an unreasonable seizure, what is the na-
ture of the interest being protected? That interest has been vari-
ously described as the right to be left alone,o individual freedom,"
5. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
6. See, e.g., id. at 541 (holding that a defendant's dropping of firearm was the prod-
uct of an illegal seizure); Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of
Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 417
n.90 (1971) ("Undoubtedly, some individuals will opt in favor of discard, in the mistaken
belief that they will not be prosecuted for a possessory offense if the goods are not discov-
ered on their persons.").
7. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1334 (1st Cir. 1994).
8. See, e.g., Brummell v. State, 685 A.2d 835, 837-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); see
also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1991).
9. Brummell, 685 A.2d at 838-39.
10. See, e.g., Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 394 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
2014] 481
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the "inviolability of the person,"2 and the right of free move-
ment."3 In Terry v. Ohio, which involved the stop and frisk of a
person, the Court emphasized the words chosen by the framers to
define the nature of the interest protected, asserting that the "in-
estimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen
on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his
study to dispose of his secret affairs."" Indeed, the Court said:
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer-
ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.""
In California v. Hodari D., the defendant, a youth, was stand-
ing with others around a car in a known high-crime area." When
they observed an unmarked police car approaching, the youths
ran." The officers pursued.'" Anticipating where Hodari would
run, Officer Pertoso succeeded in getting ahead of him.'" As Per-
toso ran directly toward him, Hodari saw the officer and then
("Under the Fourth Amendment, the judiciary has a special duty of protecting the right of
the people to be let alone . .. ."). But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51
(1967) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is not coextensive with any right to be left
alone).
11. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32 (1963) ("Implicit in the Fourth
Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is its recognition of in-
dividual freedom.").
12. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
13. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1997) (discussing drivers' and
passengers' liberty interests when a police officer orders them out of a lawfully stopped
car); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (citing United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)) (reaffirming that a seizure occurs when a reasonable person
concludes he is not free to leave).
14. 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court maintained:
Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard
against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which
the Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be con-
demned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in
criminal trials.
Id. at 15.
16. 499 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1991).
17. Id.





tossed away a rock of crack cocaine. Seconds later, Pertoso tack-
led Hodari and handcuffed him.2 1 At what point during that en-
counter should the officers' actions be labeled a seizure, requiring
the officers to justify their conduct?
Viewing the Fourth Amendment as designed to regulate police
actions, the Court in California v. Hodari D., established the
point at which a seizure of a person occurred. The Court asserted
that a seizure occurs only when a suspect submits to a show of po-
lice authority or is physically touched by law enforcement offi-
cials, who do so with the intent to seize.22 Hence, Hodari was not
seized until he was tackled and everything that occurred before
that tackling could be used to justify the seizure.2 3 Explaining its
reasoning, Justice Scalia for the Hodari D. majority candidly
stated: "Street pursuits always place the public at some risk, and
compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encour-
aged."24 Justifying its position, the Hodari D. majority added:
Only a few of those orders, we must presume, will be without ade-
quate basis, and since the addressee has no ready means of identify-
ing the deficient ones it almost invariably is the responsible course
to comply. Unlawful orders will not be deterred, moreover, by sanc-
tioning through the exclusionary rule those of them that are not
obeyed. Since policemen do not command "Stop!" expecting to be ig-
nored, or give chase hoping to be outrun, it full suffices to apply the
deterrent to their genuine, successful seizures.
This view eliminates attempts to seize from the coverage of the
Fourth Amendment.26 As a consequence, coercion or intimidation
short of a physical seizure or submission is not regulated by the
Fourth Amendment, even when the words or actions are designed
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 626.
23. See id. at 629.
24. Id. at 627.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) ("A police officer may
make a seizure by a show of authority and without the use of physical force, but there is
no seizure without actual submission . . . ."); Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
845 n.7 (1998) (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626) (asserting that Hodari D. foreclosed the
view that the Fourth Amendment applied to attempted seizures such as chases).
2014] 483
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to produce a seizure and "no matter how outrageous or unreason-
able the officer's conduct may be."27
There are consequences to making choices. Police officers adapt
to evolving legal principles and adopt tactics to exploit them. As a
result of the Hodari D. definition, police know that, if the aban-
donment or suspicious behavior occurs before the seizure, even if
prompted by an unjustified show of authority,28 they can use the
evidence abandoned or the behavior observed to justify a sei-
27. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In other contexts, police offic-
ers have been prevented from profiting indirectly from that which they cannot do directly.
For example, in Payton v. New York, the Court noted that a warrant must usually be ob-
tained to effect an arrest in a person's home. 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). The police can-
not avoid that requirement by coercing the arrestee into leaving the house. See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Johnson,
626 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1980)); United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166-67
(6th Cir. 1984). Similarly, where the protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966), prohibit interrogation by the police, the police cannot engage in the "functional
equivalent" of interrogation, including "any words or actions on the part of the police ...
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (citations omitted). The
Court in Innis stated: "To limit the ambit of Miranda to express questioning would 'place a
premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect interrogation, rather
than to implement the plain mandate of Miranda."' Id. at 299 n.3 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Hamilton, 285 A.2d 172, 175 (Pa. 1971)); cf. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. -, -, 131 S.
Ct. 1849, 1854, 1858 (2011) (indicating repeatedly that police officers who banged on the
door and announced their intent to make entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
28. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-26. Courts permit the police to use events occur-
ring after the show of authority but before submission to justify a stop, even if the initial
order was unjustified. See, e.g., United States v. Muhammad, 463 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir.
2006) (noting that the grounds for a stop can develop after an unjustified attempt to stop
by turning on the police vehicle's siren and overhead lights if defendant does not comply
with that show of authority); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 357-59 (3d Cir.
2000) (finding erroneous the district court's refusal to consider post-attempted seizure
events in evaluating justification for stop); United States v. Santamaria-Hernandez, 968
F.2d 980, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626) (discussing how Ho-
dari D. had moved the point of a seizure from the show of authority to the completed sei-
zure and how all events to that point could be used in assessing justification for the sei-
zure); People v. Thomas, 734 N.E.2d 1015, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (permitting evidence
disclosed after an attempt to make illegal seizure). Hodari D. is also widely criticized by
commentators and even by lower courts bound by it. E.g., United States v. Swindle, 407
F.3d 562, 566-70 (2d Cir. 2005) (criticizing the definition of seizure); State v. Young, 717
N.W.2d 729, 754-56 (Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (collecting authorities and sum-
marizing criticisms of Hodari D.); Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revision-
ist View, 74 MIss. L.J. 423, 462 (2004) (noting that the effect of Supreme Court develop-
ments after Terry was "to eliminate very coercive police encounters from the scope of the
Fourth Amendment guarantee of reasonableness, freeing the police on those occasions
from all judicial oversight"); Kathryn R. Urbonya, "Accidental" Shootings as Fourth
Amendment Seizures, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 337, 380-81 (1993) (asserting that Terry
is the proper standard by which to measure a seizure and that the other standards articu-
lated by the Court are unsound).
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zure." They are thus encouraged to use tactics that provoke such
a response.o Hence, jump-out squads use shows of authority to
intimidate crowds congregating in known high-drug areas to pro-
voke flight and abandonment."
To detail one example, in United States v. Flynn, police officers
set out signs on Interstate 40 in Oklahoma that read "Drug
Checkpoint 1/3 mile ahead" and "Drug Dogs in Use."32 A marked
police car was parked on the highway with its lights flashing."
Yet, there was no such checkpoint ahead, which would have vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.3 4 Instead, the supposed checkpoint
was a ruse designed to prompt drivers to exit from the highway
and disgorge contraband." Waiting in the underbrush by the exit
ramp were two police officers.3 6 The officers observed a car stop on
the ramp, an occupant dispose of a sack, and then drive down the
ramp." The sack was retrieved by the police and found to contain
29. See, e.g., People v. McClain, 149 P.3d 787, 790 (Colo. 2007) (distinguishing be-
tween pre- and post-seizure discarding of drugs); Clemons v. State, 747 So. 2d 454, 455
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing the difference between "drop then stop" cases and
"stop then drop" cases).
30. See, e.g., Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In an airport set-
ting, may a drug enforcement agent now approach a group of passengers with his gun
drawn, announce a 'baggage search,' and rely on the passengers' reactions to justify his
investigative stops?"); State v. Young, 717 N.W.2d 729, 740, 744 (Wis. 2006) (acknowledg-
ing "the potential that police officers may rely on Hodari D. to manufacture reasonable
suspicion by attempting to seize individuals in expectation that they will flee" and adher-
ing to Hodari D.'s definition for the purpose of construing the Wisconsin Constitution).
31. See, e.g., Hollinger v. State, 620 So. 2d 1242, 1242 (Fla. 1993) (discussing activity
of police conducting a "drug sweep" who dressed in black masks and SWAT-team-type re-
galia and pulled into parking lot, exited their vehicle, announced "Orange County Sheriffs
Department," and approached a group of people); Augustin v. State, 666 So. 2d 218, 221
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Altenbernd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (refer-
ring to "departmental policies encouraging officers to chase citizens" based on Hodari D.'s
definition of a seizure); State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 709 (La. 1993) (implicitly validat-
ing a drug sweep by twenty or thirty police officers and explicitly validating two of the of-
ficers who pulled up to a group of men and ordered them to "halt" and "prone out" which
caused one to move several steps and then discard drugs); Tucker, 626 So. 2d at 719 (Den-
nis, J., dissenting) (observing that minorities bear the brunt of such tactics because they
disproportionally live in "high crime" areas).
32. 309 F.3d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 2002).
33. Id.
34. Compare Flynn, 309 F.3d at 738-39 (noting that the posting of signs of a fictitious
drug checkpoint did not constitute illegal police activity), with Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that the police checkpoints violated the Fourth Amend-
ment because the primary purpose at the checkpoint was indistinguishable from the gen-
eral interest in crime control).
35. Flynn, 309 F.3d at 739.
36. Id. at 737.
37. Id.
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methamphetamine." The car was thereafter stopped and Flynn
arrested." In response to Flynn's claim that the checkpoint was
illegal, the Tenth Circuit merely had to note that Flynn never
reached any checkpoint and he voluntarily disposed of the drugs
before being stopped. 40 The court added: "The creation of a ruse to
cause the defendant to abandon an item is not illegal."4 1
The alternative choice of protecting individual security earlier
in the encounter would have yielded a much different framework.
A large number of state courts reject Hodari D. on state constitu-
tional grounds.42 Those authorities recognize that intimidation or
coercion designed to produce a stop by police officers implicates
the individual's right to be secure and that neither physical con-
tact nor submission are needed, drawing the line when a "seizure"
occurs much earlier in the encounter. 43 Thus, for example, many
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 738.
41. Id. at 739. Such activities appear popular. See United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d
1134, 1139-43 (10th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases); United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466,
467-68 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding stop of a car that committed traffic violation when exit-
ing to avoid fake drug checkpoint set up on interstate); United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d
175, 182-83 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding stop based on illegal u-turn prompted by drug
checkpoint, which was set up as a ruse); State v. Hedgeock, 765 N.W.2d 469, 477 (Neb.
2009) (holding that a ruse checkpoint does not violate the Fourth Amendment). In State v.
Kelley, the court held that the stop was constitutional partly because the defendant com-
mitted a traffic violation. 162 P.3d 832, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). The sheriffs deputies
posted signs on the highway stating "Drug dog working ahead" and "Narcotics officers
working ahead." Id. at 833. One officer sat in a lawn chair at the side of the road watching
southbound motorists as they approached the signs. Id. Upon approaching the signs, the
defendant leaned over toward the passenger's side of his car and began moving around
frantically, resulting in the vehicle drifting left of the highway centerline. Id.
42. See Joseph v. State, 145 P.3d 595, 605 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); State v. Oquendo,
613 A.2d 1300, 1310 (Conn. 1992); Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 868 (Del. 1999); State v.
Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 365 (Haw. 1992); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 665 N.E.2d 93, 94-97
(Mass. 1996); In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993); State v. Clayton,
45 P.3d 30, 34 (Mont. 2002); State v. Beauchesne, 868 A.2d 972, 979 (N.H. 2005); State v.
Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 405 (N.J. 1994); State v. Garcia, 217 P.3d 1032, 1042 (N.M. 2009);
People v. Bora, 634 N.E.2d 168, 169-70 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Puffenbarger, 998 P.2d 788,
792-93 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 776 (Pa. 1996); State
v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Young, 957 P.2d 681, 686-87
(Wash. 1998).
43. See, e.g., Oquendo, 613 A.2d at 1310-11 (holding that a seizure occurs when a rea-
sonable person would have believed he was not free to leave based on an officer's show of
authority); Beauchesne, 868 A.2d at 977-78 (describing police actions that indicate a show
of authority that can in some way restrain the liberty of the person). To discourage intimi-
dation and harassment designed to result in a seizure and to require justification for such
police actions, a test for a seizure protective of the individual should include attempted ac-
quisitions of control over the individual. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 5.1.6., at 254-56 (2d ed. 2014) (propos-
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courts would find that the actions of the police in Hodari D. of
chasing a youth and ordering him to halt would be regulated un-
der their state constitutions, meaning that the police have to jus-
tify their actions when their coercive activity began.44
The difference in choosing to construe the Fourth Amendment
in favor of individual security is illustrated by Boyd v. United
States.4 ' At issue in Boyd was the constitutionality of a statute
authorizing the compulsory production of a person's private pa-
pers to use as evidence against that person in a criminal case or
forfeiture proceeding.46 Rejecting the government's contention
that the statute did "not authorize the search and seizure of
books and papers, but only requires the defendant or claimant to
produce them," the Court observed that the act declared that if
the documents were not produced, the allegations would be treat-
ed as proven.47 The Court viewed this as "tantamount to compel-
ling their production" and as "equivalent" to an "actual" search
and seizure." The Court observed:
It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search and sei-
zure, such as forcible entry into a man's house and searching among
his papers, are wanting . . . but [the statute] accomplishes the sub-
stantial object of those acts in forcing from a party evidence against
himself. It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of
a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or
to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure would
be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and
purpose of search and seizure. 9
The Court in Boyd examined the events leading up to the
American Revolution, placing particular reliance on Entick v.
Carrington, and set forth a sweeping view of the concepts of a
search and a seizure:
ing attempted acquisition of control as the definition of a seizure). Such a test would rec-
ognize that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment depends solely on the actions of the
police. Id. at 280. Consequently, whether or when actual contact or control over the person
is achieved is immaterial, thereby including shows of authority within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
44. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1991).
45. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
46. Id. at 618.
47. Id. at 621.
48. Id. at 621-22.
49. Id. at 622.
2014] 487
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The principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of consti-
tutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete
form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circum-
stances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employds of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but .. . it is the
invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the es-
sence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and open-
ing boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any for-
cible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. 0
Thus, the Boyd Court created the concept of a "constructive"
search and viewed such an action as indistinguishable from an
"actual" search." In discussing why it construed the concept of a
search and seizure broadly, that majority opined:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggra-
vating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet . . . it contains their
substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It may
be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight devia-
tions from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradu-
al depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitution-
al rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis ["withstand begin-
nings"].
Hodari D. and Boyd illustrate different views regarding the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, with fundamentally different
rules that stemmed from those views, causing very different re-
sults. But those choices and consequences are not merely histori-
cal.
50. Id. at 630; see Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 2 Wils K.B.
275.
51. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 621-22 (holding that compelling a person to produce docu-
ments equates to a seizure of the documents). The Boyd Court did not characterize the
search as "constructive." That characterization is from a later case. See Okla. Press Publ'g
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202 (1946); see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950) (noting that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are
"not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extend[ as well to the orderly
taking under compulsion of process").
52. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
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III. CONSTRUING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: NO FOOLISH
CONSISTENCIES BY THE CURRENT COURT
Emerson wrote: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little
minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines.""
The Court throughout the course of its history of construing the
Fourth Amendment cannot be accused of this. Although the pre-
vious section utilizes older cases to illustrate the choices the
Court has made, one does not have to look back to find such di-
vergent views. They remain at the heart of the analysis today.
In Florida v. Jardines, the Court was asked to determine if a
sniff of a front door of a home by a trained police dog was a
search." While standing on the porch with his police handler, the
dog sniffed and then alerted to the presence of drugs inside the
house." Justice Scalia, for the majority, concluded that the ac-
tions were a search, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment estab-
lishes a simple base line, one that for much of our history formed
the exclusive basis for its protections: When "the Government ob-
tains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, pa-
pers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment has undoubtedly occurred.""
To support that view, the majority examined the fundamental
purpose of the Fourth Amendment:
[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among
equals. At the Amendment's "very core" stands "the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion." This right would be of little practical value if
the State's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and
trawl for evidence with impunity; the right to retreat would be sig-
nificantly diminished if the police could enter a man's property to ob-
serve his repose from just outside the front window.
Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy
and Breyer, dissented." Justice Alito would have made a different
53. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE ESSAYS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 18, 24 (1934).
54. 569 U.S. _ _, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
55. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
56. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ,
n.3, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950-51 n.3 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1420.
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rule. 9 For him, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
regulate police behavior.60 Alito could "see no ground for hamper-
ing legitimate law enforcement" by labeling the actions in
Jardines a search.61 He believed that "when officers walk up to the
front door of a house, they are permitted to see, hear, and smell
whatever can be detected from a lawful vantage point."62
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Bailey v. United
States, asserted that the general rule is that Fourth Amendment
seizures required probable cause." He cited authority for the view
that that standard had "roots that are deep in our history" and
that the standard "represent[s] the accumulated wisdom of prec-
edent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary
to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment."" Such a standard implements the
view that the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect individuals from the government.
In Bailey, the Court was confronted with a situation where the
police were about to execute a search warrant on a private resi-
dence." A person-Bailey-was seen leaving the residence, but
police waited to detain him until he had traveled about a mile
away from the residence.6 6 There was no evidence that Bailey was
either "aware of the officers' presence or had any knowledge of
the impending search."67
Patently, the general rule requiring probable cause to arrest
did not apply to Bailey's detention." Justice Kennedy, for the ma-
jority, acknowledged that there were exceptions to that general
59. See id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1420-21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1423.
61. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1426.
62. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1423 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213
(1986)).
63. 568 U.S. _, , 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213 (1979)).
64. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1037, (alteration in original) (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S.
at 208; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
65. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1036.
66. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1036.
67. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1036.
68. See id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 1035-37, 1042 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 697-98, 705 (1982)).
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rule." One exception permits the suspicionless detentions of oc-
cupants on the premises when a search warrant is being execut-
ed, which was first approved by the Court in Michigan v. Sum-
mers." Summers was detained as he left his residence." So should
the general rule or the exception be applied in Bailey? More
broadly, how should exceptions to a general rule be constructed?
To protect the general rule, Justice Kennedy in Bailey ob-
served: "An exception to the Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting
detention absent probable cause must not diverge from its pur-
pose and rationale."72 Thus, the majority in Bailey limited the of-
ficer's authority to detain persons in light of the general rule's
purpose-only those occupants who are in the "immediate vicini-
ty" of the premises where the warrant is being executed may be
detained." Kennedy asserted:
The risk that a departing occupant might notice the police surveil-
lance and alert others still inside the residence is . . . an insufficient
safety rationale to justify expanding the existing categorical authori-
ty to detain so that it extends beyond the immediate vicinity of the
premises to be searched. If extended in this way the rationale would
justify detaining anyone in the neighborhood who could alert occu-
pants that the police are outside, all without individualized suspicion
of criminal activity or connection to the residence to be searched.
This possibility demonstrates why it is necessary to confine the
Summers rule to those who are present when and where the search
is being conducted. 4
Justice Scalia, concurring in Bailey, emphasized the hierarchal
nature of the inquiry: probable cause is the general rule for a de-
tention; an exception to that rule, recognized by the Court in
Summers, is when the police execute a search warrant and locate
persons on the premises to be searched based on the necessities of
the situation." Hence, for him, the only question was whether
Bailey was on the premises." Because Bailey was stopped a mile
away, Scalia opined, the exception "cannot sanction Bailey's de-
69. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1037 (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 697-98).
70. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1041-42; see Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05.
71. Bailey, 568 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1038; see Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.
72. Bailey, 568 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1038 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
500 (1983)).
73. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1042.
74. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1039-40.
75. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at
704-05; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)).
76. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1043.
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tention. It really is that simple."" He rejected the lower court's
contrary view:
The Court of Appeals read Summers' spatial constraint somewhat
more promiscuously: In its view, it sufficed that police observed Bai-
ley "in the process of leaving the premises" and detained him "as
soon as practicable." That has pragmatic appeal; police, the argu-
ment runs, should not be precluded from seizing the departing occu-
pant at a distance from the premises if that would be safer than
stopping him on the front steps. But it rests on the fallacy that each
search warrant entitles the Government to a concomitant Summers
detention. Conducting a Summers seizure incident to the execution
of a warrant "is not the Government's right; it is an exception-
justified by necessit -to a rule that would otherwise render the
[seizure] unlawful."'
Scalia emphasized: "What the dissent misses is that a 'categor-
ical' exception must be defined by categorical limits.""
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissent-
ed."o Nowhere in Breyer's opinion is there an acknowledgement
that the general rule is that a seizure be supported by probable
cause. Why? Because he had a much different view of the goal to
be achieved."' He observed that, in drafting a rule, the rule should
take "more directly into account concerns related to safety, evi-
dence, and flight, i.e., the kinds of concerns more directly related
to the Fourth Amendment's 'ultimate touchstone of . .. reasona-
bleness."'82 Perhaps for emphasis, he repeated this point:
I believe that the majority has substituted a line based on indeter-
minate geography for a line based on realistic considerations related
to basic Fourth Amendment concerns such as privacy, safety, evi-
dence destruction, and flight. In my view, these latter considerations
83
should govern the Fourth Amendment determination at issue here.
77. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1043.
78. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1044 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir. 2011)).
79. Id. at n.*, 133 S. Ct. at 1044 n.*.
80. Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1045 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1046-47.
82. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1048 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. , , 131 S.
Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)).
83. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1049.
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Breyer maintained that a better rule to ascertain whether a de-
tention away from the scene was permitted was whether the de-
tention occurred as soon as reasonably practicable.
The majorities in Bailey and Jardines offer a fairly straight-
forward explanation of the Fourth Amendment's purpose, which
in turn should guide in the construction of Fourth Amendment
principles. Read together, they perceive that the overriding pur-
pose is to protect the individual. To effectuate that purpose, gen-
eral rules are created: there is a need for individualized suspicion
to detain a person, and a search occurs when the police physically
invade the curtilage and use a tool to learn something about the
interior of the home." Once a general rule has been established
that is protective of the individual, exceptions to that rule must
be similarly drawn to reflect that purpose. Hence, for example,
under the rule in Bailey, the police can only detain persons in the
immediate vicinity of the premises when executing a warrant in-
stead of further away from the scene."
However, other current cases take a different approach. The
dissents in Bailey and Jardines espoused such a view. But that
rulebook approach to effectuate police intrusions is not confined
to dissents. Two recent cases are illustrative. In Florence v. Board
of Chosen Freeholders, the Court was asked to determine whether
a visual inspection of the naked body of arrestees for minor of-
fenses was permissible as an incident to incarceration." The
Court concluded that it was." Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, believed that a readily administered rule was needed."
He employed the balancing test, which assesses the relative
strengths of the government and individual interests in a given
search or seizure procedure."o Kennedy discussed at length the
government's interests but never examined in any detail the indi-
vidual's interests." His opinion repeatedly emphasized that the
84. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 1045 (citing United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 208 (2d
Cir. 2011)).
85. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. , , 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013); Bailey, 568
U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1037 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)).
86. Bailey, 568 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1041.
87. 566 U.S. , _, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513 (2012).
88. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 1523.
89. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 1522 (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
347 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 1523.
91. See id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 1518-22.
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Court should defer to the expertise of the prison officials.92 Most
tellingly, Kennedy maintained that the burden of establishing the
unconstitutionality of the practice was on those challenging it, ra-
ther than on the government, in seeking to depart from the indi-
vidualized suspicion standard."
If the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the indi-
vidual, one would place the burden on the government to justify
its actions. Hence, the dissent by Justice Breyer maintained that
the government had the burden of establishing a "convincing rea-
son indicating that, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, invol-
untary strip searches of those arrested for minor offenses are
necessary."" Breyer examined the purported governmental rea-
sons at some length and concluded: "The majority is left with the
word of prison officials in support of its contrary proposition. And
though that word is important, it cannot be sufficient."" Breyer
argued that, for minor offenses that do not involve drugs or vio-
lence, the kind of search involved in Florence required a showing
of "reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual possesses
drugs or other contraband" in order to be reasonable." He saw
that standard as workable and consistent with the practices of
many incarceration facilities.
Similarly, in Maryland v. King, the Court approved the taking
and examination of the DNA of arrestees, purportedly to help as-
certain the identity of those persons." Justice Kennedy, for the
majority, balanced the governmental and individual interests.99
The majority premised its decision on Maryland procedures that,
in part, limited the use of the DNA and required that the sample
only be processed after a judicial finding of probable cause that
92. Id. at -, 132 S. Ct. at 1513-14 ("In addressing this type of constitutional claim
courts must defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains sub-
stantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to
problems of jail security.").
93. Id. at -, 132 S. Ct. at 1518 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85
(1984)).
94. Id. at -, 132 S. Ct. 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer's dissent was joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 1525.
95. Id. at -_, 132 S. Ct. at 1531.
96. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 1525.
97. See id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 1528-30.
98. 569 U.S. -_, _, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).




the arrestee had committed the offense.00 In rejecting individual-
ized suspicion as a criterion for the DNA search, the majority rea-
soned, in part, that the procedures governing the obtaining of the
DNA were so standardized that a warrant was not needed. 0'
Kennedy concluded:
In light of the context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause
respondent's expectations of privacy were not offended by the minor
intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks. By contrast, that same con-
text of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying
respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his
charges but also so that the criminal justice system can make in-
formed decisions concerning pretrial custody. Upon these considera-
tions the Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a
reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking
procedure.10 2
Justice Scalia, dissenting, took a much different view, based on
a much different premise. He maintained:
The Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a
crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the
crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence. That prohibition
is categorical and without exception; it lies at the very heart of the
Fourth Amendment. Whenever this Court has allowed a suspicion-
less search, it has insisted upon a justifying motive apart from the
investigation of crime.xo0
Scalia grounded that framework in the historical context of the
Fourth Amendment: "At the time of the Founding, Americans
despised the British use of so-called 'general warrants'-warrants
not grounded upon a sworn oath of a specific infraction by a par-
ticular individual, and thus not limited in scope and applica-
tion."104 He detailed the evolution of search and seizure provisions
at that time and drew this lesson:
As ratified, the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause forbids a war-
rant to "issue" except "upon probable cause," and requires that it be
"particula[r]" (which is to say, individualized) to "the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." And we have held
that, even when a warrant is not constitutionally necessary, the
100. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1970.
101. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4
(2006); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989)).
102. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
103. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg, So-
tomayor, and Kagan joined in his dissent. Id.
104. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1980-81.
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Fourth Amendment's general prohibition of "unreasonable" searches
imports the same requirement of individualized suspicion.'os
Scalia acknowledged that the Court had created exceptions to
that rule but that those exceptions applied "only when a govern-
mental purpose aside from crime-solving is at stake."10 6 He put it
another way: "No matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless
searches are never allowed if their principal end is ordinary
crime-solving."10 ' He criticized the majority for failing to offer any
framework to explain how its decision squared with Fourth
Amendment principles:
Why not just come out and say that any suspicionless search of an
arrestee is allowed if it will be useful to solve crimes? The Court does
not say that because most Members of the Court do not believe it. So
whatever the Court's major premise-the opinion does not really
contain what you would call a rule of decision-the minor premise is
"this search was used to identify King." The incorrectness of that
minor premise will therefore suffice to demonstrate the error in the
Court's result.0 s
Scalia proceeded to explain why, in his view, the DNA sam-
pling was used not to identify who the police had detained but to
establish what else the arrestee may had done.'09 He then ob-
served:
Solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, but it occupies a lower
place in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protec-
tion of our people from suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The
Fourth Amendment must prevail.
Today's judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solv-
ing more crimes; then again, so would the taking of DNA samples
from anyone who flies on an airplane (surely the Transportation Se-
curity Administration needs to know the "identity" of the flying pub-
lic), applies for a driver's license, or attends a public school. Perhaps
the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt
105. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1981 (alteration in original) (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 308 (1997)).
106. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1982.
107. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1982.
108. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1982 n.1.
109. Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1985.
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that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have
been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.1
Collectively, the four cases just examined-Jardines, Bailey,
Florence, and King-are remarkable for shifting majorities that
are grounded in two fundamentally different views of the Fourth
Amendment. King and Florence are so divorced from the premise
that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect
individuals, that the reasoning of the majority opinions in each
case focus almost exclusively on societal interests in collecting
DNA or examining the naked bodies of arrestees, with hardly a
word about the interests of the individual."' Bailey and Jardines
are in stark contrast, offering protection to individuals against
unjustified intrusions, grounded in the historical purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.112
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: PROTECTING THE
INDIVIDUAL
This part assumes as a premise something that the Fourth
Amendment explicitly promises-security to individuals. The
Fourth Amendment informs us that it is a "right."113 It is no great
leap to say that it should therefore be interpreted in a manner fa-
vorable to the enhancement of individual liberty. Nor is it a big
step to conclude that the Fourth Amendment, at its most funda-
mental level, is designed to protect people from the government.
The inquiry in each case should examine the essence of what the
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect: the individual's right to be
secure.
The validity of that premise seems hard to question and it is
not examined in detail here. Much ink-and blood-has been
spilled to establish its validity. History has long played a very
important role in the Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. The details of the historical record will not be re-
110. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1989.
111. See supra notes 91-93, 100-02 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 56-57, 63-64 and accompanying text.
113. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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counted here."' Instead, the emphasis is on the lessons that
should be drawn from that record.
No historical event is more important than the Writs of Assis-
tance case in 1761."' It is emblematic of the era."' The Writs case
and the competing views articulated by its advocates continue to
serve as a template in the never-ending struggle to accommodate
individual security and governmental needs."7  In that case,
James Otis challenged British search and seizure practices and
offered an alternative vision of proper search and seizure princi-
114. The historical record is complex, involving hundreds of years of evolution in the
regulation of searches and seizures, with many contradictory developments. For the au-
thoritative treatment on the history of search and seizure in England and its American
colonies from 602 to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, see WILLIAM J.
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791 (2009). A
shorter summary may be found in CLANCY, supra note 43, ch. 2, at 39-74. Rather than the
broad currents of history, the events in England and in the American colonies during the
period immediately preceding the American Revolution directly served as a catalyst for
the Fourth Amendment's adoption; it is also the portion of the historical record that is
most often recalled in Supreme Court opinions and by leading commentators in interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment. For treatment of the crucial era between 1761 and 1791, see
Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 86 IND. L.J. 979 (2011).
115. JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., Paxton's Case of the Writ of Assistance, in REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1762, at 51 (1865) [hereinafter Writs of Assis-
tance Case]; see e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) ("[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment was most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a regime of
writs of assistance . . . ."); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment was "the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out
of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle with England");
TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE,
AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 38 (1969) ("The writs of assistance
were anathema in the colonies, and Otis' argument against them was well known among
the founding fathers."). Numerous cases quote James Otis' arguments or generally recog-
nize the importance of the Writs case. See e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608-09
(1980) (White, J., dissenting); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116 n.17 (1975); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (noting that the use of general warrants "was a motivat-
ing factor behind the Declaration of Independence"); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364
(1959); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(stating that the revulsion was "so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent
causes of the Revolution"); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (stating that the abuses surrounding searches and seizures "more than any
one single factor gave rise to American independence"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 625 (1886) (stating that the debate over the issuance of the writs of assistance in
Massachusetts in 1761 "was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the
resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country").
116. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 3 (1978) (demonstrating the wide-
spread dissatisfaction with writs of assistance in the American colonies at the time).
117. Writs of Assistance Case, supra note 115, at 51-57.
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ples."' No authority preceding Otis had articulated so completely
the framework for the search and seizure requirements that were
ultimately embodied in the Fourth Amendment."' However, Otis'
importance then and now stems not just from the particulars of
his argument; instead, he played and should continue to play an
inspirational role for those seeking to find the proper accommoda-
tion between individual security and governmental needs. 20
Smuggling was a widespread practice in the American colonies
and writs of assistance were a principal means of combating the
practice, particularly in Massachusetts.121 Writs were not issued
as a result of any information that contraband was stored at a
specified place; instead, the customs officials could search wher-
ever they chose.122 "The discretion delegated to the official was
therefore practically absolute and unlimited."22 The use of the
writs of assistance for customs searches and seizures "caused pro-
found resentment" in the colonies 24 and their use is considered to
be "the first in the chain of events which led directly and irresist-
ibly to revolution and independence."12' In 1760, new writs of as-
sistance were needed and a group of Boston merchants opposed
the proposed writs, retaining James Otis to represent their
cause. 126 The question upon which the case ultimately turned was
whether the superior court should continue to grant the writs in
general and open-ended form-as a species of "general war-
rants"12 7-Or whether it should limit the writs to a single occasion
based on particularized information given under oath. 2 8
118. See SMITH, supra note 116, at 7 ("[T]he American tradition of constitutional hostil-
ity to general powers of search first found articulate expression.").
119. LANDYNSKI, supra note 115, at 35.
120. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Importance of James Otis, 82 MISS. L.J. 487
(2013).
121. E.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 115, at 30.
122. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 54 (1937).
123. Id.
124. LANDYNSKI, supra note 115, at 31.
125. AMERICAN HISTORY LEAFLETS: COLONIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL, NO. 33, JAMES
OTIS'S SPEECH ON THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE 1761 (Albert Bushnell Hart & Edward Chan-
ning eds. 1906).
126. THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY:
FROM 1749 TO 1774, at 89 (John Hutchinson ed. 1828).
127. Id. at 93-94.
128. JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY app. I, at 531-32 (1865).
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Significant aspects of Otis' arguments became elements of
Fourth Amendment structure and jurisprudence."' They include:
Identifying the right to be "secure" as the interest implicated by a
search or seizure; listing the home as a protected place; utilizing the
common law search warrant as a model for when warrants can issue;
defining unjustified intrusions as "unreasonable"; and indicating
that probable-cause based searches and seizures are proper.13o
Within that list, there are two important themes-an identifica-
tion of the nature of the individual interest implicated by a search
or seizure and the requirement of objective standards by which to
measure the propriety of a search or seizure.
A. The Nature of the Individual Interest
Otis characterized the nature of the individual interest that
was implicated when the government searches, that is, the per-
son's security.'"' He spoke about the "fundamental [p]rinciple[]" of
the law that was "[t]he Priviledge of House. A Man, who is quiet,
is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle . . . ."13 What
was protected was a fundamental, indefensible right."' Otis' ef-
forts encouraged those in opposition to the government and
"taught" the people that the practices were "incompatible with
English liberties."'3 4 Recalling Otis' argument many years later,
John Adams wrote that Otis examined the acts of trade and
demonstrated that "they destroyed all our security of property,
liberty, and life."'
Another famous champion of liberty, well known to the colo-
nists, was John Wilkes."' After complaining of the seizure of all
129. See generally Clancy, The Framers' Intent, supra note 114, at 908-81 (discussing
Otis' arguments and their influence on John Adams, the primary architect of the Fourth
Amendment).
130. See id. at 1006.
131. Id. at 1059.
132. John Adams, No. 44 Petition of Lechmere 1761, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 106, 125 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
133. See generally QUINCY, supra note 128, app. I, at 483-85 (containing quotes of Lord
Coke that Otis used to argue the right could not be waived).
134. HUTCHINSON, supra note 126, at 94-95.
135. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 1, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 314, 316 (Charles Francis Ad-
ams ed., 1856).
136. See generally Clancy, The Framers'Intent, supra note 114, at 1006-12 (describing
the general warrants case Wilkes v. Wood).
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his papers under a general warrant and receiving the reply from
the authorities that such papers that did not prove his guilt for
seditious libel would be returned, Wilkes countered: "I fear nei-
ther your prosecution nor your persecution, and I will assert the
security of my own house, the liberty of my person, and every
right of the people, not so much for my own sake, as for the sake
of every one of my English fellow subjects.""' That same con-
cept-the right to be secure-was utilized by Adams in Article 14
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and is replicated in
the Fourth Amendment.'" More broadly, the identification of an
individual right of security was repeatedly referenced in the
framing era as justification for the Fourth Amendment in a Bill of
Rights."' It follows that the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect the individual right to be secure.
137. PETER D. G. THOMAS, JOHN WILKES: A FRIEND TO LIBERTY 32 (1996) (footnote
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Clancy, The Framers' Intent, supra note 114, at 1027-29. Adams, as a young at-
torney, was in the room when Otis made his famous argument. Id. at 981. In 1779, John
Adams drafted Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which became the
model for the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1027, 1029. Article 14 provided:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his possessions. All war-
rants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them
be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in the
warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one
or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied
with a special designation of the person or objects of search, arrest or seizure;
and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities pre-
scribed by the laws.
Id. at 1028 (quoting MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1780 art. XIV, reprinted in LASSON,
supra note 122, at 82 n.15). The sole change made to Adams' draft was to substitute the
word "subject" for "man." 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 1263 n.24 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds.,
1989); cf. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 158 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that because the Fourth Amendment was based on the Massachusetts model,
"[t]his is clear proof that Congress meant to give wide, and not limited, scope to [the] pro-
tection against police intrusion").
139. See CLANCY, supra note 43 § 3.2.1., at 79-83 (discussing the origin and meaning of
the word "secure"); Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Proper-
ty, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 350-51 (1998). The right to be se-
cure was closely associated with property and recent Supreme Court cases, including
Jardines, have returned to this view. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. _, , 133 S. Ct.,
1409, 1414-15 (2013); Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Priva-
cy, or Security?, supra at 309-10; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. _, , 133 S.
Ct. 945, 949 (2012) ("The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connections to
property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to 'the right of the people to be se-
cure against unreasonable searches and seizures'; the phrase 'in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects' would have been superfluous."). A person's private papers were seen as
almost sacred. See CLANCY, supra note 43 § 3.2.1., at 84-85.
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B. Objective Criteria to Regulate Governmental Searches and
Seizures
There is an intimate connection between a person's right to be
secure and the procedures utilized by the government to search
and seize. Unless rules are crafted to protect that individual
right, it becomes meaningless. Otis recognized this. The writs
procedure, he maintained, made each person subject to "petty ty-
rants."'4 0 Otis discussed the uncontrolled discretion of the customs
officials: "[C]an a community be safe with an uncontroul'd power
lodg'd in the hands of such officers, some of whom have given
abundant proofs of the danger there is in trusting them with
ANY?,"', The writs of assistance were also viewed as deficient be-
cause, inter alia, they existed for an unlimited length of time,
they were not returnable, no oath was required for one to issue,
and no grounds were needed to justify the request.'42 Moreover,
Otis criticized the manner in which the customs searches oc-
curred: "Houses were to be broken open, and if a piece of Dutch
linen could be found, from the cellar to the cock-loft, it was to be
seized and become the prey of governors, informers, and majes-
ty."'43 The writ, he concluded, "is a power, that places the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer."'44
Importantly, Otis offered an alternative procedure to search-
warrants for stolen goods, which he called "special" warrants.'
He believed that process was protective of individual liberties-so
did the framers.'46 The framework that Otis advocated ultimately
became embodied in the warrant clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment, including the requirement of probable cause as a justifica-
tion for a warrant to issue.' Warrants for stolen goods, Otis stat-
ed, are "directed to special officers," are limited "to search certain
houses . . . specially set forth in the writ," and issued based upon
140. QUINCY, supra note 128, app. I, at 490.
141. Id. at 494.
142. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 132, at 114.
143. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor, supra note 135, at 319.
144. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, app. A,
at 520, 524 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850) [hereinafter 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS].
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. E.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 114, at 382 (noting that Otis' "proclamation that only




the oath of the person who asked for the warrant "that he sus-
pects such goods to be concealed in those very places he desires to
search.""' Otis argued that the need for the invasion "always
ought to be determin'd by adequate and proper judges."149 Hence,
Otis detailed the criteria that should be utilized for a warrant to
issue:
[SIpecial writs may be granted on oath and probable suspicion....
[A]n officer should show probable ground; should take his oath of it;
should do this before a magistrate; and that such magistrate, if he
think proper, should issue a special warrant to a constable to search
the places.'50
Consistent with the historical record and often inspired by it,
Supreme Court opinions periodically recognize that the Fourth
Amendment was designed by the framers to protect individuals
from unreasonable governmental intrusion and that rules should
be crafted to reflect that purpose. Boyd, as discussed in Part II,
and Jardines and Bailey, discussed in Part III, are examples of
this viewpoint."' There are many others."2 The next part discuss-
es how rules should be crafted to further that purpose.
V. CRAFTING RULES TO IMPLEMENT PURPOSE
The Court uses a variety of interpretative tools as aids in for-
mulating legal principles to implement Fourth Amendment com-
148. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 144, app. A, at 524.
149. QUINCY, supra note 128, app. I, at 490.
150. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 144, app. A, at 525. Similar concerns
about general warrants arose in England shortly after the Writs case. See Money v. Leach,
(1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.); 3 Burr. 1741; Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep.
807 (K.B.); 2 Wils. K.B. 275; Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B); Lofft 1; Huck-
le v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.); 2 Wils. K.B. 206. The cases are traditionally
viewed as having had a significant influence on American thought about search and sei-
zure practices in the era leading up to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. CLANCY,
supra note 43 § 2.2.3.2., at 51-56.
151. See supra notes 45-52, 54-84 and accompanying text.
152. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (stating that it would reject
inquiry into the practical consequences of a rule requiring warrant for in-home arrests be-
cause, inter alia, "such arguments of policy must give way to a constitutional command
that we consider to be unequivocal"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)
("What we do know is that the Framers were men who focused on the wrongs of that day
but who intended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would
far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth."); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court
(Keith) 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now
shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance.").
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mands. Depending on the era and whether a conservative or lib-
eral majority holds sway on the Court, different tools have been
utilized.' However, tools implement a purpose. They are not the
fundamental considerations. They are not the fundamental prem-
ise.
Professor Morgan Cloud, after analyzing the pragmatic basis
that had come to dominate the Court's opinions in the latter part
of the twentieth century, concluded: "The Court's opinions
demonstrate that if the fourth amendment is to function as a de-
vice that protects individual autonomy by limiting government
power, its interpretation must rest upon a theory that emphasiz-
es strong rules, yet is sufficiently flexible to cope with the diverse
problems arising under the fourth amendment."1 4 He argued for a
rule-based interpretive theory of the Fourth Amendment, with
the rules derived "from normative claims justified by the history
and text of the amendment, but ultimately grounded in a value-
based claim about the nature of the amendment."' Cloud
claimed: "Simply put, if liberty is the goal, rules are needed.""' He
ultimately concluded that "the fourth amendment example teach-
es us that without some coherent system of rules designed to lim-
it [the power of the government], solitary individuals who claim
the right to be free from government intrusions will lose, and the
principle of liberty embodied in the amendment gradually will
disappear.,,m
If the Fourth Amendment's fundamental purpose is to protect
an individual right, then rules should start with that premise and
further that goal. This part examines two legal frameworks that
the Court has employed to illustrate how rules could be construed
to further that goal."' First, this part discusses the role of bright
153. CLANCY, supra note 43 § 1.3., at 14.
154. Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 286 (1993).
155. Id. at 293-94.
156. Id. at 297.
157. Id. at 302.
158. I have offered a framework that addresses the major Fourth Amendment concepts,
including what the Fourth Amendment protects and how to measure the reasonableness of
an intrusion in my prior writing. See CLANCY, supra note 43 § 11.5., at 620. For example, I
have proposed
a hierarchical structure to the analysis of reasonableness that employs objec-
tive criteria, is grounded in the Framers' values, is informed by the course of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and accommodates contemporary needs. At
the summit of that hierarchy is individualized suspicion, which is fundamen-
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lines in creating rules of general applicability, then it discusses
the role of necessity in creating exceptions to general rules.
A. Bright-Line Rules
The Fourth Amendment's commands are said to be "practical
and not abstract"15' and that there is perceived to be a consequent
need for a workable rule for law enforcement officials to follow:'
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusion-
ary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-
day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readi-
ly applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement ac-
tivities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated
set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring
the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the
sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
eagerly feed, but they may be literally impossible of application by
the officer in the field.16 '
Thus, in some situations, "[a] single, familiar standard is essen-
tial to guide police officers, who have only limited time and exper-
tise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests
involved in the specific circumstances they confront.""
tal to principled analysis of reasonableness questions. Next in order is the
warrant preference rule. That rule should not have general applicability; it
should be limited instead to intrusions into buildings, a person's body, and
speech-related concerns. Individualized suspicion and the warrant preference
rule are the preferred models of reasonableness. Departures from those mod-
els can only be justified if necessary to effectuate a strong governmental in-
terest. In those extraordinary circumstances, neutral and objective criteria
must be utilized to regulate the permissibility of governmental intrusions.
Finally, because of the wide applicability of the Amendment, there are unu-
sual situations where those three models do not coherently address the ques-
tion of reasonableness. Under such circumstances, a case-by-case analysis
may have to be used. But to do so, the Court must first demonstrate the in-
applicability of the two preferred models and the neutral criteria model.
Id. (footnote omitted).
159. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577 (1971) (quoting United States v. Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983).
161. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1975 SUP. CT.
REV. 127, 141) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14
(1979)).
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Accordingly, the Court sometimes utilizes bright-line rules to
guide the police in executing searches and seizures,"' which do
not require case-by-case justification and provide "clear legal
boundaries to police conduct."164 Such rules are said to be prem-
ised on the recognition that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment "can only be realized if the police are acting under a
set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of
privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement."'
Many bright-line rules address recurring situations to clarify
what police can or cannot do. For example, for searches incident
to arrest, the police can always search the person and the grab
area around that person, so long as the person arrested is not in
an automobile.'66 During a traffic stop, the officer can always or-
der the driver and all passengers out of the vehicle.'6 7 In Florence,
as discussed, the Court recently created the bright-line rule per-
mitting the authorities to visually scan the naked body of all per-
sons to be incarcerated after arrest."' Although each of these
rules clarify law enforcement authority, each also undeniably in-
vades the privacy and security of many persons who are not dan-
gerous or who do not harbor evidence.
Underlying many bright-line rules is a legitimate concern for
the safety of the police officer in confronting persons suspected of
a crime."' Beyond that admittedly important interest, few guide-
lines exist to predict when the Court will adopt a bright-line rule
or elect case-by-case adjudication.' More fundamentally, howev-
163. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410, 412 (1997) (permitting police of-
ficers to order all passengers to exit a vehicle as an incident of a stop of any vehicle).
164. David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 37 (1994). Yet, at other times, the Court has rejected such analysis, viewing bright
lines as having utility only in exceptional situations. E.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,
39 (1996).
165. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, supra note 161, at 142). Belton is per-
haps the Court's most notable defense of bright-line rules, where the Court applied such a
rule to searches of motor vehicles incident to arrest. That result has now been rejected in
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), but the methodology persists.
166. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
167. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412, 415.
168. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. , , 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513-14
(2012).
169. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Su-
preme Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1436 (2003).
170. See generally id. at 1429-36 (analyzing the Court's choices between bright-line
rules and case-by-case analysis and observing that "no coherent theory undergirds" it).
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er, is the distinction between a rule that is clear in its application
and the substance of the rule: a clear rule is desirable but says
nothing about the choice between two equally clear rules, one of
which furthers the individual's protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment and the other that diminishes those protections."
Often, as the above illustrations demonstrate, the Court creates
rules that favor police interventions. Thus, the Court has stated:
"Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment
balance . . . credit the government's side with an essential inter-
est in readily administrable rules."172 However, the use of per se
rules to allow governmental intrusions is at least arguably inimi-
cal to much of the underlying purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
if its purpose is to protect individual rights. Instead, bright-line
rules that favor individual rights by being over-inclusive of those
deserving protection should be treated more favorably than per se
rules that permit intrusions. 17 For example, to arrest a person in
that person's home, the Court requires that, with the exception of
exigent circumstances, the police must first obtain an arrest war-
rant.14
If the Fourth Amendment protected group rights, bright-line
rules that favor police intrusions would make more sense. The
people's right to be secure-as a group-would arguably be ad-
vanced by screening techniques that involve large numbers of in-
dividuals with the purpose to weed out individual criminals. That
view of the Fourth Amendment should not prevail. The Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect individuals from governmental
intrusions."' Hence, logically, bright-line rules that routinely al-
low certain intrusions should be rejected or restricted in applica-
171. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 709-10 (1998). Professor Donald Dripps has observed: "The Fourth
Amendment cases are difficult because both determinacy and legitimacy are important
values." Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: De-
terminacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MiSS. L.J. 341, 407
(2004). He believes that the Court has erred in emphasizing determinacy over legitimacy.
Id. at 342. More generally, he maintains, there is an inherent tension between the two
values: "[L]egitimate Fourth Amendment doctrine is prone to indeterminacy, and deter-
minate doctrine is prone to illegitimacy." Id. at 342-43.
172. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
173. Cf. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (stating that general-
ly a person subject to warrantless arrest must be presented to a magistrate for a probable
cause determination within forty-eight hours).
174. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra Part IV.A.
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tion. Bailey reflects this view, which confined detentions of per-
sons during the execution of search warrants to those in the "im-
mediate vicinity" of the location searched.'7 ' King, however, re-
flects the opposing view, opening the door to mass, suspicionless
DNA testing. 77
B. Constructing Exceptions in Light of the Purpose of the General
Rule: The Role of Necessity
Jeremiah Gridley, the attorney general of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, defended the general writs of assistance in the Writs
case.'7 ' Although Gridley conceded that the "common privileges of
Englishmen" were taken away,"' he argued that the writs were
necessary to enforce the customs laws:
[Tihe necessity of the Case and the benefit of the Revenue .... [T]he
Revenue [was] the sole support of Fleets & Armies abroad, & Minis-
ters at home[,] without which the Nation could neither be preserved
from the Invasions of her foes, nor the Tumults of her own Subjects.
Is not this I say infinitely more important, than the imprisonment of
Thieves, or even Murderers? yet in these Cases 'tis agreed Houses
may be broke open.... So it is established, and the necessity of hav-
ing public taxes effectually and speedily collected is of infinitely
greater moment to the whole, than the Liberty of any Individual.
No record indicates whether Otis addressed Gridley's admitted-
ly strong governmental interests. Instead, Otis outlined circum-
stances when the individual's interest could be legally invaded: a
person's security in his home is "forfeited" only "in cases of the
most urgent necessity and importance.""' Otis characterized the
need as: "For flagrant Crimes, and in Cases of great public Neces-
sity," a person's house may be invaded.'
176. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. -, _, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1042 (2013).
177. See Maryland v. King, 569,U.S. _ -, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) ("DNA iden-
tification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine book-
ing procedure.").
178. SMITH, supra note 116, at 548; see QUINCY, supra note 128, at 476-81.
179. SMITH, supra note 116, at 281.
180. Id. at 281; see generally QUINCY, supra note 128, at 476-82 (outlining Gridley's
argument).
181. QUINCY, supra note 128, at 490.
182. Id. at 471.
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From Gridley to the present, claims of necessity have often
been invoked in justifying searches."' Indeed, in King, Justice
Scalia criticized the majority for departing from the probable
cause standard in the absence of any showing of necessity. 114
What Gridley failed to do, and what Otis and Scalia did do, was
distinguish between a strong governmental need and how to ef-
fectuate that interest through the creation of rules protective of
the individual.' A pamphleteer in England, a short time after
the Writs case, commenting on the use of general warrants to
pursue persons suspected of seditious libel, captured the essence
of this point: "No necessities of state can ever be a reason for quit-
ting the road of law in the pursuit of a libeller."" In other words,
merely because the government has a strong interest does not
mean that it can use any or all means to effectuate that inter-
est."' That confusion of ends and means has surfaced repeatedly
in contemporary Fourth Amendment analysis.'"' Many cases fail
to distinguish between the strength of the government interest
involved and the methods needed to effectuate that interest.189
183. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 116, at 281; QUINCY, supra note 128, at 471, 490.
184. 569 U.S. _, _ , 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981-82 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., id. at 1989-90; QUINCY, supra note 128, at 471, 490.
186. FATHER OF CANDOR, LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, THE SEIZURE OF
PAPERS 32 (3d ed. 1765). Referring to times of rebellion as illustrating an argument for
true necessity for the use of general warrants, the writer observed that, in such situations,
men may "wink at all irregularities." Id. at 49. He added: "And yet, bad men ... will be
apt to lay stress upon such acts of necessity, as precedents for their doing the like in ordi-
nary cases, and to gratify personal pique, and therefore such excesses of power are dan-
gerous in example, and should never be excused . . . ." Id. He concluded that, even in cases
of high treason where persons could not be named, the use of general warrants would be
"applied to his pardon, and not to his justification." Id. at 50.
187. E.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42-43 (2000) (rejecting the "se-
vere and intractable nature of the drug problem" as insufficient to depart from individual-
ized suspicion); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-74 (1979) (citing Almedia-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-75 (1973); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S.
581, 595 (1948)) (rejecting suspicionless searches of luggage, despite recognition that
Puerto Rico had serious problem with an "influx of weapons and narcotics" and stating
that "we have not dispensed with the fundamental Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures simply because of a generalized urgency of law en-
forcement"); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 317 (1984) ("The 'general searches' which the framers sought to outlaw
when they enacted the fourth amendment may well have been 'cost-justified,' and were
defended on precisely this basis.").
188. See, e.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42; Torres, 442 U.S. at 472-74.
189. See, e.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44-47 (utilizing a programmatic purpose analysis
to distinguish between permissible and impermissible suspicionless intrusions); Mich.
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990) (stating that it was up to politi-
cally accountable officials to choose among reasonable alternative law enforcement tech-
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"Necessity" should mean that it must be shown that utilizing a
model of reasonableness that has been developed to protect the
individual's right to be secure, if employed in the case before the
court, will not safeguard an overriding governmental interest.o90
This conception of necessity is reflected in the Court's initial de-
partures from the individualized suspicion model."' A similarly
strong conception of exigency traditionally permeated the ques-
tion whether the police could search without a warrant.19 2 Neces-
sity has several interrelated facets, which are discussed else-
where, 93 but at its most fundamental level, it requires the
government to show a very strong interest which can only be
niques); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 631 (1989) (permitting substance
abuse testing of all crew members of trains involved in an accident or in a rule violation
because serious train accident scenes frequently are chaotic, making it "impractical" for
investigators to determine which crew members contributed to the accident).
190. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Without proof that the
police cannot develop individualized suspicion that a person is driving while impaired by
alcohol, I believe the constitutional balance must be struck in favor of protecting the public
against even the 'minimally intrusive' seizures involved in this case."); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 575 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("There is no principle
in the jurisprudence of fundamental rights which permits constitutional limitations to be
dispensed with merely because they cannot be conveniently satisfied."); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion) (espousing the concept that constitu-
tional provisions against arbitrary governmental actions are "inoperative when they be-
come inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise . . . if allowed to flourish would
destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our Govern-
ment").
191. See Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967) (viewing as rea-
sonable area-wide health and safety code enforcement inspections designed to combat the
dangers that fires and epidemics pose to large urban areas because other canvassing tech-
niques would not achieve acceptable results); see also 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 10.2(d), at 59 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that the Camara court's analysis included
the determination "that 'acceptable results' in code enforcement could not be accomplished
if it were necessary to establish in advance the probability that a particular violation was
present in a particular building"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment
Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 91-92 (stating that Camara re-
flected the widely shared opinion that alternative procedures to area-wide inspections
were unworkable).
192. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that no warrant
is required to enter a house when police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, with the
Court noting: "Speed here was essential"); see also Christopher Slobogin, The World With-
out a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 32 (1991) (arguing for view of exigency that
defines "imminence" narrowly to prevent the exception from swallowing the warrant re-
quirement).
193. See generally CLANCY, supra note 43 § 11.3.4.4.3., at 603-06 (discussing the role of
necessity in measuring reasonableness in Supreme Court opinions); id. § 11.5.3.2., at 628-
33 (discussing the role that necessity should have).
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effectuated by departing from a general rule of the Fourth
Amendment that favors the individual. 194
Once a general rule has been established that is protective of
the individual, exceptions to that rule must be similarly drawn to
reflect that purpose. For example, as the Bailey Court acknowl-
edged, the general rule is a person may only be detained by the
police based on probable cause to believe that person is involved
in criminal activity.' There are recognized exceptions to that
rule, including detentions of occupants without suspicion during
the execution of a search warrant for a residence."' How should
the scope of such an exception be measured? To protect the gen-
eral rule, the majority in Bailey acknowledged: "An exception to
the Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting detention absent proba-
ble cause must not diverge from its purpose and rationale." The
danger of departures without this guide was candidly admitted by
the Court, which included the possibility of detaining other per-
sons who happened to be in the neighborhood."' Hence, in Bailey,
the Court created the rule that, when executing a warrant, the
police can only detain occupants who are in the immediate vicini-
ty of the premises."' Justice Scalia, concurring in Bailey, empha-
sized the hierarchal nature of the inquiry with clarity: Probable
cause is the general rule for a detention; an exception to that rule
applies when the police execute a search warrant and locate per-
sons on the premises to be searched.2 00 Thus, for him, the only
question was whether Bailey was on the premises.20 ' Because Bai-
ley was stopped a mile away, the exception "cannot sanction Bai-
ley's detention. It really is that simple."
What should also be simple is the requirement of putting the
burden on the government to justify departures from general
rules. For example, the Court has repeatedly stated that war-
rants are a preferred mode of searching and the government has
194. See id. § 11.3.4.4.3., at 606-07.
195. 568 U.S. , _, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (quoting Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)).
196. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 1037-38 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
704-05 (1981)).
197. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. 1038.
198. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1039-40.
199. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1041.
200. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 1043.
202. Id.
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the burden of showing a need to search without one. 20" That bur-
den has traditionally been a high one-a showing of necessity.204
In contrast, the Court in King put the burden on the persons chal-
lenging the suspicionless DNA testing.205 Such a burden is incon-
sistent with the vast bulk of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In sum, a structure of Fourth Amendment analysis should look
like this: An acknowledgement that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect individuals from governmental intru-
sions; general rules are created to further that purpose; and ex-
ceptions to those general rules must be based on a strong showing
of need, with the government bearing the burden of proof. To par-
aphrase Justice Scalia, it really should be that simple.206
VI. SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST AS ILLUSTRATING THE
CREATION OF RULES BASED ON PURPOSE
Searches incident to arrest are commonly utilized and, given
the development of modern police forces and the statutory expan-
sion of the number of crimes, such searches now apply to large
numbers of criminal suspects. Moreover, given the ubiquity of cell
phones and other digital devices on and about persons in today's
world, those devices are increasingly searched incident to ar-
rest.2 The development of principles governing search incident to
arrest illustrates how general rules should inform the nature of
exceptions to a general rule and the scope of such exceptions.
A. Nature of the Rule: Per Se Versus Case-by-Case
Search incident to arrest principles have undergone significant
evolution since the imposition of the exclusionary rule on federal
authorities in 1914.208 First, the nature of the justification for
searches incident to arrest has had several iterations. Many cases
203. CLANCY, supra note 43 § 11.3.1., at 571-73.
204. See id. § 11.3.4.4.3., at 603-09.
205. 569 U.S. at _, _ , 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977-80 (2013).
206. See Bailey, 568 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 1043 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding
search of cell phone found in arrestee's pocket); see also CLANCY, supra note 43 § 8.7., at
443-46.
208. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (recognizing the well-




prior to Robinson v. United States viewed searches incident to ar-
rest in terms of an exception to the warrant requirement, which
intimated an exigent circumstances rationale and, perhaps, a
need to justify the search in each case.20 ' Although not all of the
Supreme Court's cases reflected that view,"0 a dispositive doctri-
nal shift in the underlying justification for searches incident to
arrest occurred in Robinson.21 ' That majority opinion, written by
Justice Rehnquist, stated:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasona-
ble intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justifi-
cation. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the au-
thority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the war-
rant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasona-
ble" search under that Amendment.2 1 2
The Court's statement in the second sentence of this quotation
deserves emphasis: searches incident to arrests were viewed in
Robinson not only as an exception to the general rule that war-
rants are required but as a rule unto themselves-their own gen-
eral rule.2 1 3 This allowed the Court to create a structure for
searches incident to arrest without regard to any other Fourth
Amendment satisfaction doctrines.2 " Thus, in Robinson, which
involved the arrest of a person driving on a suspended license, the
Court adopted a "categorical" search incident to arrest rule: it ap-
plied to all arrests, regardless of the underlying factual circum-
stances.21 In so ruling, the Court rejected a case-by-case inquiry
and any analogy to a protective frisk for weapons, which must be
justified in each case by examining whether there are circum-
stances giving rise to the reasonable belief that the person accost-
209. Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948). There was
at least some common law authority that a search incident to arrest was based on the cir-
cumstances of each case. See David E. Aaronson & Rangeley Wallace, A Reconsideration of
the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident to Arrest, 64 GEO. L.J. 53, 55-56
(1975) (citing Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox CRIM. L. CASES 329, 332 (Oxford Cir. 1853)).
210. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950).
211. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35.
212. Id. at 235.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 220-21, 236.
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ed is armed and dangerous.2 16 The significance of Robinson was to
distinguish the search incident to arrest principle from other sit-
uations where the Court has found an exception to the warrant
preference rule.217 For searches incident to arrest, permissibility is
not determined by applying the case-by-case exigency analysis
used to justify exceptions to the warrant preference rule.218
Robinson's view prevailed in subsequent decades219 until the re-
cent decision in Arizona v. Gant, which changed the rule for
searches of vehicles incident to arrest.220 Gant, rhetorically, repre-
sented a return to a case-by-case exigency approach, viewing
searches incident to arrest as an exception to the warrant prefer-
ence rule.221 Under prior precedent, the police could search the en-
tire passenger compartment incident to the arrest of an occupant
of the vehicle.222 The Court in Gant rejected that principle and
created two new rules for searches incident to arrest of persons
who are in vehicles.22 3 They were: (1) a vehicle search is not per-
mitted incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee is
secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle; and (2) a
vehicle search is permissible if the police have a reasonable belief
that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehi-
cle. 224
Explaining the first rule, Justice Stevens, writing for a majori-
ty of five, stated that a search of a vehicle incident to arrest is
permissible "only when the arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search."2 "2 Explaining the second rule, Stevens asserted "that
circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search
incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of
216. Id. at 227-28 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-25 (1968)).
217. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.__ , 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 n.3 (2013).
218. Id.; see Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
219. E.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-77 (2008) ("The interests justifying
search are present whenever an officer makes an arrest."); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 35 (1979) ("The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search [of the
person arrested]."); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (noting that "since it is
the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search," the lack of a subjec-
tive belief by the officer that the person arrested is armed and dangerous is irrelevant).
220. 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
221. Id. at 338.
222. Id. at 341 (citing New York v. Belton 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
223. Id. at 350-51.
224. Id. at 335.
225. Id. at 343.
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the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle."226 Justice Ste-
vens viewed the primary rationale of the new rules as protecting
privacy interests.2 27 He saw the prior doctrine, which authorized
police officers to search not just the passenger compartment but
"every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space," as
creating "a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of count-
less individuals."2 28 He also maintained that the prior rule was
229
unnecessary to protect legitimate law enforcement interests.
The majority in Gant explicitly limited the new rules to motor
vehicle searches. 2 0 As dissenting Justice Alito maintained in
Gant, however, the new rules have no rational limitation to vehi-
cle searches.23 1 His argument posed the question: Why does the
rule not apply to all arrestees?2 2 The majority's opinion failed to
adequately answer that question. Gant creates the bizarre situa-
tion where an individual is more protected in an automobile than
in his own home, which is fundamentally inconsistent with other
aspects of Supreme Court doctrine.
226. Id. at 335.
227. Id. at 344-45.
228. Id. at 345.
229. Id. at 346. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, said that he did not like the ma-
jority's new rules but liked the dissent's view even less; he did not want to create a 4-1-4
situation and, therefore, joined the majority opinion, although acknowledging that it was
an "artificial narrowing" of prior cases. Id. at 354 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia stated
that the rule he wanted was that the police could only search a vehicle incident to arrest if
the object of the search was evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made. Id. at
353; see also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627-32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (viewing searches incident to arrest as an "exception" and engaging in fact sensitive
analysis of whether the search incident to arrest is justified in the case).
230. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
231. Id. at 363-64 (Alito, J., dissenting).
232. Id. Several courts have rejected a broad application of Gant. E.g., United States v.
Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2010); State v. Ellis, 355 S.W.3d 522, 525 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2011). But others have extended Gant beyond the automobile context. See United
States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 317, 321 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding the search of the gym bag
carried by the arrestee was permissible under the following rule: "[W]e hold that a search
is permissible incident to a suspect's arrest when, under all the circumstances, there re-
mains a reasonable possibility that the arrestee could access a weapon or destructible evi-
dence in the container or area being searched. Although this standard requires something
more than the mere theoretical possibility that a suspect might access a weapon or evi-
dence, it remains a lenient standard."); Angad Singh, Comment, Stepping Out of the Vehi-
cle: The Potential of Arizona v. Gant to End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest Beyond
the Vehicular Context, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1759, 1762 (2010) (seeking to apply Gant to
searches incident to arrest of persons and in home); Jackie L. Starbuck, Comment, Rede-
fining Searches Incident to Arrest: Gant's Effect on Chimel, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1253,
1280 (2012) (concluding that "[tihe Supreme Court should abolish any distinction between
vehicle searches and home searches by making Gant's explication of Chimel and the 'area
of immediate control' the controlling authority for all searches incident to arrest").
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The Robinson line of authority offered a view of search incident
to arrest doctrine that was categorical: such searches were per se
reasonable.2 " Taken to its logical conclusion, what should flow
from such a view is a simple series of rules, permitting detailed
searches of persons and the property they possess in all cases as
an incident to arrest. Such a bright-line rule avoids, or should
avoid, inconsistent decisions based on similar facts and gives the
police a workable rule to apply in each case. That rule is, howev-
er, a very blunt instrument. Frankly, it is an evidence-gathering
technique. It has little relationship to the protective justification
for searches incident to arrest in the many cases where there is
no factual basis for believing that the suspect could obtain evi-
dence or a weapon.2'
Gant is fundamentally inconsistent with Robinson, based on its
view that searches incident to arrest are an exception to the war-
rant requirement and in requiring justification for searches be-
yond the fact of an arrest.23 5 One view should ultimately prevail.
Either Robinson or Gant has to be overruled. Which should pre-
vail? Looking broadly at search incident to arrest doctrine, the
Court has rejected two separate analyses that would reflect the
application of two independent legal questions: (1) whether an ar-
rest has occurred; and (2) whether a search incident to arrest
should be permitted.' Those are two separate intrusions. The
first is based on probable cause that the person is involved in
criminal activity and is not of concern.23 The second intrusion
raises the concern whether the search incident to arrest rule
should have per se applicability once it is determined that the en-
counter constitutes an arrest or whether search incident to arrest
principles should be modified to apply. to only some arrests.238 If
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the individu-
al, it would seem that the government should have to justify each
intrusion separately. Although the goal here is not to create a se-
ries of search incident to arrest rules, abandonment of the per se
233. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
234. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination
of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIs. L. REV. 657, 695 (2002) (quoting United States v.
McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1990)).
235. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
236. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an 'Arrest" Within the Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129, 177 (2003).
237. Id. at 178.
238. Id. at 178-79.
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rule would seem to necessarily follow from the premise. More nu-
anced rules protective of the individual might include limiting
permissible search incident to arrest based on categories of crime
for which the arrest is being made239 or premised on a factual in-
1 40quiry to establish whether one of the two justifications for the
search incident to arrest rule is actually present in each case.4
Gant's second rule-requiring that the police have reason to be-
lieve that evidence of the offense might be in the area
searched24 2-should be viewed in this light.
B. The Scope of the Rule
Once a general rule is established, the scope of that rule and
exceptions to it must be crafted in light of that rule's purpose. In
the context of searches incident to arrest, the Court struggled
throughout much of the twentieth century to establish the proper
scope of the area around the arrestee that may be searched.
This is not surprising given its inability to settle on a general rule
that was protective of the individual. The cases are informative
because they represent the first attempts by the Court to denote
the proper scope of an intrusion in non-warrant situations. The
debate concerning the scope of a search incident to arrest also
239. Cf. Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1993) (finding that issuing a traffic
citation was a form of arrest but rejecting permissibility of a custodial arrest and "body
search" for person who was riding bicycle without a bell); State v. Paul T., 993 P.2d 74, 77-
79 (N.M. 1999) (observing the ambiguity as to whether the search incident to arrest prin-
ciple applied to situations other than "custodial" arrests and holding, under the New Mex-
ico Constitution, that the police could not conduct a full search of a juvenile who violated
curfew law that provided for release to parent or guardian). Similarly, prior to its constitu-
tional changes, California courts differentiated between types of crimes when applying the
search incident to arrest principle. See, e.g., People v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Cal.
1976); People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1106 (Cal. 1975). Such a rule would remove
much of the incentive to arrest for a minor crime in order to conduct an evidentiary search
for other crimes.
240. E.g., State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 50 (Vt. 2007) (requiring, for search incident to
arrest in the vehicle context, a showing that either of the two traditional justifications are
actually present under the state constitution).
241. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (holding that police officers cannot
search incident to traffic citations and discussing why the traditional rationales of the
search incident to arrest rule did not apply).
242. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
243. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770-72 (1969) (White, J., dissenting)
(tracing the "modern odyssey" of the Court's treatment of the search incident to arrest rule
throughout the twentieth century and observing that there had been at least five signifi-
cant shifts in emphasis).
2014] 517
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
capsulizes the core problem of measuring the reasonableness of
the scope of an intrusion:
If upon arrest you may search beyond the immediate person and the
very restricted area that may fairly be deemed part of the person,
what rational line can be drawn short of searching as many rooms as
arresting officers may deem appropriate for finding "the fruits of the
crime"? Is search to be restricted to the room in which the person is
arrested but not to another open room into which it leads? Or, take a
house or an apartment consisting largely of one big room serving as
dining room, living room and bedroom. May search be made in a
small room but not in such a large room? If you may search the bed-
room part of a large room, why not a bedroom separated from the
dining room by a partition? These are not silly hard cases. They put
the principle to a test.2 4 4
The Court's cases on the permissible scope of a search incident
to arrest are grounded in inconsistent models to measure reason-
ableness. 2 45 One view of reasonableness, the case-by-case model,
has no criteria that persists from case to case.46 Perhaps the most
notable case espousing this case-by-case analysis is United States
v. Rabinowitz, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless search
of a one-room office as incident to a valid arrest:
What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula. The Constitution does not define what are "unreasonable"
searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-
paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches
247
must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case.
When that case-by-case analysis was applied, with its lack of
objective criteria, the scope of the search was invariably broad,
extending to all items within the suspect's "control."248 What was
in a person's "control" could prove to be elusive. Illustrative is
Harris v. United States, where the Court reasoned that the scope
of the search incident to arrest could extend to all of the rooms of
Harris' four-room apartment because he was in "effective control"
of the apartment and the evidence sought could have been con-
244. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 79 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
245. See CLANCY, supra note 43 § 8.8., at 446-48.
246. Id. § 11.3.3., at 586 (quoting Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
357 (1931)) ("There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to
be decided on its own facts and circumstances.").
247. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63.
248. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 770-71 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing how prior
case law had grounded the scope of permissible search incident to arrest procedures based
on what was in "control" of arrestee).
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cealed anywhere in the apartment. 249 Dissenting in that case, Jus-
tice Murphy argued:
The result is that a warrant for arrest is the equivalent of a general
search warrant or writ of assistance; as an "incident" to the arrest,
the arresting officers can search the surrounding premises without
limitation for the fruits, instrumentalities and anything else con-
nected with the crime charged or with any other possible crime. They
may disregard with impunity all the historic principles underlying
the Fourth Amendment relative to indiscriminate searches of a
man's home when he is placed under arrest. They may disregard the
fact that the Fourth Amendment was designed in part, indeed per-
haps primarily, to outlaw such general warrants, that there is no ex-
ception in favor of general searches in the course of executing a law-
ful warrant for arrest. As to those placed under arrest, the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment on searches are now words
without meaning or effect.25
The warrant preference model maintains that a search or sei-
zure is per se unreasonable subject to exceptions based on a
strong showing of need.25 ' When the warrant preference model
was applied, searches incident to arrest were of limited scope, in-
fluenced heavily by the warrant clause requirement of particular-
ity.252 In Chimel, the warrant preference model emerged as the
clear winner to measure scope issues, with the Court rejecting
both the methodology and the results in Rabinowitz and Harris.25 3
In Chimel, the Court found the scope of the search unreasonable
when the police searched the arrestee's entire three-bedroom
house as incident to his arrest, looking for evidence implicating
him in the burglary of a coin shop.254 A significant portion of the
249. 331 U.S. 145, 152 (1947).
250. Id. at 191 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
251. See CLANCY, supra note 43 § 11.3.1., at 571-73.
252. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) ("It is a mistake to as-
sume that a search warrant in these circumstances would contribute nothing to the
preservation of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. A search warrant must
describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Without
such a warrant, however, officers are free to determine for themselves the extent of their
search and the precise objects to be seized. This is no small difference. It is a difference
upon which depends much of the potency of the right of privacy. And it is a difference that
must be preserved even where contraband articles are seized in connection with a valid
arrest."); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ("The authority of officers to
search one's house or place of business contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein
upon a valid warrant of arrest certainly is not greater than that conferred by a search
warrant issued upon adequate proof and sufficiently describing the premises and the
things sought to be obtained.").
253. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
254. Id. at 753-54, 768.
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Court's analysis focused on the standard justification for the war-
rant preference rule, that is, the interjection of a magistrate be-
tween the citizen and the police and the central role that probable
cause played.5 Importantly, however, the Court also relied on the
rejection of general warrants embodied in the warrant clause and
the requirement that the scope of a "search must be strictly tied
to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible."' In applying those principles to a search incident to
arrest, the Court observed:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the ar-
rest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the ar-
resting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun
on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate
control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or,
for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other
closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the
absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the
authority of a search warrant. The "adherence to judicial processes"
257
mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.
In limiting the scope of the intrusion, the Chimel Court empha-
sized:
It is argued in the present case that it is "reasonable" to search a
man's house when he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded
on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of
certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to
Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis,
Fourth Amendment protection in this area would approach the
evaporation point. It is not easy to explain why, for instance, it is
255. Id. at 758-59, 761 (citing Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 705).
256. Id. at 761-62 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
257. Id. at 762-63 (footnote omitted).
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less subjectively "reasonable" to search a man's house when he is ar-
rested on his front lawn-or just down the street-than it is when he
happens to be in the house at the time of arrest.2ss
Since Chimel, the scope of the search incident to arrest rule's
application to areas beyond the arrestee's person has been set-
tled-at least rhetorically. 2" That scope as defined by Chimel in-
cludes only those areas within the arrestee's "immediate control,"
which is in turn defined as those areas where the arrestee "might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items."26 The area
to be searched (with the exception of vehicle searches), is a fact-
based inquiry in each case. 26 1
In sum, search incident to arrest principles demonstrate the
incoherence of Fourth Amendment doctrine when the Court loses
sight of the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
There is a fundamental disconnect in Robinson on one side and
Gant and Chimel on the other. Robinson's general rule is that a
search incident to arrest produces its own general rule.26 ' But
Gant and Chimel viewed such searches as an exception to the
warrant preference rule.6 If the purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to protect the individual, then the structure of search in-
cident to arrest principles would be much different. As to the na-
ture of the rule, it would be viewed as an exception to a general
rule of reasonableness, grounded in necessity. From that view
would flow a series of rules based on a showing of exigency, which
is traditionally viewed as case specific. As to the scope of the
permissible search, the Chimel framework would then reinforce
the general rule by limiting the area searched to protect the va-
lidity of the general rule.
258. Id. at 764-65 (footnote omitted).
259. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620 (2004) ("Although easily
stated, the Chimel principle had proved difficult to apply in specific cases."); Mincey v. Ar-
izona, 437 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1978) (rejecting an exception to warrant requirement for
search of residence after entering house to arrest); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34
(1970) (suggesting that officers cannot use arrestee as a "walking search warrant" by mov-
ing him into house and from room to room to conduct warrantless search of house).
260. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. This grab area has often been referred to as the "wing-
span" or "lunge area." THOMAS K. CLANCY, CYBER CRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE:
MATERIALS AND CASES 178-79 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); Moskovitz, su-
pra note 234, at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. CLANCY, CYBER CRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE, supra note 260, at 179.
262. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
263. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Court has a difficult task: construing the broad terms of a
very old document that now regulates modern, diverse intrusions
by the government. That task should start with a point of view.
The Fourth Amendment was designed by the framers to protect
individuals from the government; its fundamental goal was not to
help facilitate governmental intrusions. General rules should ef-
fectuate that purpose. Exceptions to general rules should be
based on a strong showing by the government of a need to depart
from the general rule and any exception should be designed to
protect the general rule.
